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Abstract
Despite the exploding interest in graph neural networks there has been little effort
to verify and improve their robustness. This is even more alarming given recent
findings showing that they are extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks on
both the graph structure and the node attributes. We propose the first method for
verifying certifiable (non-)robustness to graph perturbations for a general class
of models that includes graph neural networks and label/feature propagation. By
exploiting connections to PageRank and Markov decision processes our certificates
can be efficiently (and under many threat models exactly) computed. Furthermore,
we investigate robust training procedures that increase the number of certifiably
robust nodes while maintaining or improving the clean predictive accuracy.
1 Introduction
As the number of machine learning models deployed in the real world grows, questions regarding
their robustness become increasingly important. In particular, it is critical to assess their vulnerability
to adversarial attacks – deliberate perturbations of the data designed to achieve a specific (malicious)
goal. Graph-based models suffer from poor adversarial robustness [13, 60], yet in domains where
they are often deployed (e.g. the Web) [50], adversaries are pervasive and attacks have a low cost
[9, 26]. Even in scenarios where adversaries are not present such analysis is important since it allows
us to reason about the behavior of our models in the worst case (i.e. treating nature as an adversary).
Here we focus on semi-supervised node classification – given a single large (attributed) graph and
the class labels of a few nodes the goal is to predict the labels of the remaining unlabelled nodes.
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have emerged as the de-facto way to tackle this task, significantly
improving performance over the previous state-of-the-art. They are used for various high impact
applications across many domains such as: protein interface prediction [20], classification of scientific
papers [28], fraud detection [44], and breast cancer classification [36]. Therefore, it is crucial to asses
their sensitivity to adversaries and ensure they behave as expected.
However, despite their popularity there is scarcely any work on certifying or improving the robustness
of GNNs. As shown in Zügner et al. [60] node classification with GNNs is not robust and can even
be attacked on multiple fronts – slight perturbations of either the node features or the graph structure
can lead to wrong predictions. Moreover, since we are dealing with non i.i.d. data by taking the
graph structure into account, robustifying GNNs is more difficult compared to traditional models –
perturbing only a few edges affects the predictions for all nodes. What can we do to fortify GNNs
and make sure they produce reliable predictions in the presence of adversarial perturbations?
We propose the first method for provable robustness regarding perturbations of the graph structure.
Our approach is applicable to a general family of models where the predictions are a linear function
of (personalized) PageRank. This family includes GNNs [29] and other graph-based models such as
label/feature propagation [7, 53]. Specifically, we provide: 1. Certificates: Given a trained model
and a general set of admissible graph perturbations we can efficiently verify whether a node is
certifiably robust – there exists no perturbation that can change its prediction. We also provide non-
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robustness certificates via adversarial examples. 2. Robust training: We investigate robust training
schemes based on our certificates and show that they improve both robustness and clean accuracy.
Our theoretical findings are empirically demonstrated and the code is provided for reproducibility1.
Interestingly, in contrast to existing works on provable robustness [23, 46, 59] that derive bounds (by
relaxing the problem), we can efficiently compute exact certificates for some threat models.
2 Related work
Neural networks [41, 21], and recently graph neural networks [13, 60, 58] and node embeddings [5]
were shown to be highly sensitive to small adversarial perturbations. There exist many (heuristic)
approaches aimed at robustifying these models, however, they have only limited usefulness since there
is always a new attack able to break them, leading to a cat-and-mouse game between attackers and
defenders. A more promising line of research studies certifiable robustness [23, 35, 46]. Certificates
provide guarantees that no perturbation regarding a specific threat model will change the prediction
of an instance. So far there has been almost no work on certifying graph-based models.
Different heuristics have been explored in the literature to improve robustness of graph-based models:
(virtual) adversarial training [10, 16, 40, 49], trainable edge weights [48], graph encoder refining and
adversarial contrastive learning [45], transfer learning [42], smoothing distillation [10], decoupling
structure from attributes [31], measuring logit discrepancy [51], allocating reliable queries [56],
representing nodes as Gaussian distributions [57], and Bayesian graph neural networks [52]. Other
robustness aspects of graph-based models (e.g. noise or anomalies) have also been investigated
[3, 6, 24]. However, none of these works provide provable guarantees or certificates.
Zügner & Günnemann [59] is the only work that proposes robustness certificates for graph neural
networks (GNNs). However, their approach can handle perturbations only to the node attributes. Our
approach is completely orthogonal to theirs since we consider adversarial perturbations to the graph
structure instead. Furthermore, our certificates are also valid for other semi-supervised learning
approaches such as label/feature propagation. Nonetheless, there is a critical need for both types
of certificates given that GNNs are shown to be vulnerable to attacks on both the attributes and the
structure. As future work, we aim to consider perturbations of the node features and the graph jointly.
3 Background and preliminaries
Let G = (V, E) be an attributed graph with N = |V| nodes and edge set E ⊆ V ×V . We denote with
A ∈ {0, 1}N×N the adjacency matrix andX ∈ RN×D the matrix of D-dimensional node features
for each node. Given a subset VL ⊆ V = {1, . . . , N} of labelled nodes the goal of semi-supervised
node classification is to predict for each node v ∈ V one class in C = {1, . . . ,K}. We focus
on deriving (exact) robustness certificates for graph neural networks via optimizing personalized
PageRank. We also show (Appendix 8.1) how to apply our approach for label/feature propagation [7].
Topic-sensitive PageRank. The topic-sensitive PageRank [22, 27] vector piG(z) for a graph G and
a probability distribution over nodes z is defined as piG,α(z) = (1−α)(IN −αD−1A)−1z. 2 Here
D is a diagonal matrix of node out-degrees with Dii =
∑
jAij . Intuitively, pi(z)u represent the
probability of random walker on the graph to land at node u when it follows edges at random with
probability α and teleports back to the node v with probability (1− α)zv . Thus, we have pi(z)u ≥ 0
and
∑
u pi(z)u = 1. For z = ev , the v-th canonical basis vector, we get the personalized PageRank
vector for node v. We drop the index on G,α and z in piG,α(z) when they are clear from the context.
Graph neural networks. As an instance of graph neural network (GNN) methods we consider an
adaptation of the recently proposed PPNP approach [29] since it shows superior performance on the
semi-supervised node classification task [19]. PPNP unlike message-passing GNNs decouples the
feature transformation from the propagation. We have:
Y = softmax
(
ΠsymH
)
, Hv,: = fθ(Xv,:), Π
sym = (1− α)(IN − αD−1/2AD−1/2)−1 (1)
where IN is the identity,Πsym ∈ RN×N is a symmetric propagation matrix, H ∈ RN×C collects
the individual per-node logits, and Y ∈ RN×C collects the final predictions after propagation. A
1Code, data, and supplementary material available at https://www.daml.in.tum.de/graph-cert
2In practice we do not invert the matrix, but rather we solve the associated sparse linear system of equations.
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neural network fθ outputs the logitsHv,: by processing the featuresXv,: of every node v indepen-
dently. Multiplying them withΠsym we obtain the diffused logitsHdiff := ΠsymH which implicitly
incorporate the graph structure and avoid the expensive multi-hop message-passing procedure.
To make PPNP more amenable to theoretical analysis we replace Πsym with the personalized
PageRank matrix Π = (1 − α)(IN − αD−1A)−1 which has a similar spectrum. Here each
row Πv,: = pi(ev) equals to the personalized PageRank vector of node v. This model which we
denote as pi-PPNP has similar prediction performance to PPNP. We can see that the diffused logit
after propagation for class c of node v is a linear function of its personalized PageRank score:
Hdiffv,c = pi(ev)
TH:,c, i.e. a weighted combination of the logits of all nodes for class c. Similarly, the
margin mc1,c2(v) =H
diff
v,c1 −Hdiffv,c2 = pi(ev)T (H:,c1 −H:,c2) defined as the difference in logits for
node v for two given classes c1 and c2 is also linear in pi(ev). If mincmyv,c(v) < 0, where yv is the
ground-truth label for v, the node is misclassified since the prediction equals argmaxcH
diff
v,c .
4 Robustness certificates
4.1 Threat model, fragile edges, global and local budget
We investigate the scenario in which a subset of edges in a directed graph are "fragile", i.e. an attacker
has control over them, or in general we are not certain whether these edges are present in the graph.
Formally, we are given a set of fixed edges Ef ⊆ E that cannot be modified (assumed to be reliable),
and set of fragile edges F ⊆ (V × V) \ Ef . For each fragile edge (i, j) ∈ F the attacker can decide
whether to include it in the graph or exclude it from the graph, i.e. setAij to 1 or 0 respectively. For
any subset of included F+ ⊆ F edges we can form the perturbed graph G˜ = (V, E˜ := Ef ∪ F+).
An excluded fragile edge (i, j) ∈ F \ F+ is a non-edge in G˜. This formulation is general, since we
can set Ef and F arbitrarily. For example, for our certificate scenario given an existing clean graph
G = (V, E) we can set Ef = E and F ⊆ V × V which implies the attacker can only add new edges
to obtain perturbed graphs G˜. Or we can set Ef = ∅ and F = E so that the attacker can only remove
edges, and so on. There are 2|F| (exponential) number of valid configurations leading to different
perturbed graphs which highlights that certificates are challenging for graph perturbations.
In reality, perturbing an edge is likely to incur some cost for the attacker. To capture this we introduce
a global budget. The constraint |E˜ \ E| + |E \ E˜| ≤ B implies that the attacker can make at most
B perturbations. The first term equals to the number of newly added edges, and the second to the
number of removed existing edges. Here, including an edge that already exists does not count towards
the budget. This is only a design choice that depends on the application, and our method works
in general. Furthermore, perturbing many edges for a single node might not be desirable, thus we
also allow to limit the number of perturbations locally. Let Ev = {(v, j) ∈ E} be the set of edges
that share the same source node v. Then, the constraint |E˜v \ Ev|+ |Ev \ E˜v| ≤ bv enforces a local
budget bv for the node v. By setting bv = |Fv| and B = |F| we can model an unconstrained attacker.
Letting P(F) be the power set of F , we define the set of admissible perturbed graphs:
QF = {(V, E˜ := Ef∪F+) | F+ ∈ P(F), |E˜ \E|+|E \E˜| ≤ B, |E˜v\Ev|+|Ev\E˜v| ≤ bv,∀v} (2)
4.2 Robustness certificates
Problem 1. Given a graph G, a set of fixed Ef and fragile F edges, global B and local bv budgets,
target node t, and a model with logitsH . Let yt denote the class of node t (predicted or ground-truth).
The worst-case margin between class yt and class c under any admissible perturbation G˜ ∈ QF is:
m∗yt,c(t) = minG˜∈QF myt,c(t) = minG˜∈QF piG˜(et)
T (H:,yt −H:,c) (3)
If m∗yt,∗(t) = minc 6=yt m
∗
yt,c(t) > 0, node t is certifiably robust w.r.t. the logitsH , and the set QF .
Our goal is to verify whether no admissible G˜ ∈ QF can change the prediction for a target node t.
From Problem 1 we see that if the worst margin over all classesm∗yt,∗(t) is positive, thenm
∗
yt,c(t) > 0,
for all yt 6= c, which implies that there exists no adversarial example withinQF that leads to a change
in the prediction to some other class c, that is, the logit for the given class yt is always largest.
3
Challenges and core idea. From a cursory look at Eq. 3 it appears that finding the minimum
is intractable. After all, our domain is discrete and we are optimizing over exponentially many
configurations. Moreover, the margin is a function of the personalized PageRank which has a non-
trivial dependency on the perturbed graph. But there is hope: For a fixedH , the margin myt,c(t) is a
linear function of pi(et). Thus, Problem 1 reduces to optimizing a linear function of personalized
PageRank over a specific constraint set. This is the core idea of our approach. As we will show, if we
consider only local budget constraints the exact certificate can be efficiently computed. This is in
contrast to most certificates for neural networks that rely on different relaxations to make the problem
tractable. Including the global budget constraint, however, makes the problem hard. For this case we
derive an efficient to compute lower bound on the worst-case margin. Thus, if the lower bound is
positive we can still guarantee that our classifier is robust w.r.t. the set of admissible perturbations.
4.3 Optimizing topics-sensitive PageRank with global and local constraints
We are interested in optimizing a linear function of the topic-sensitive PageRank vector of a graph by
modifying its structure. That is, we want to configure a set of fragile edges into included/excluded to
obtain a perturbed graph G˜ maximizing the objective. Formally, we study the general problem:
Problem 2. Given a graph G, a set of admissible perturbations QF as in Problem 1, and any fixed
z, r ∈ RN , α ∈ (0, 1) solve the following optimization problem: maxG˜∈QF rTpiG˜,α(z).
Setting r = −(H:,yt −H:,c) and z = et, we see that Problem 1 is a special case of Problem 2. We
can think of r as a reward/cost vector, i.e. rv is the reward that a random walker obtains when visiting
node v. The objective value rTpi(z) is proportional to the overall reward obtained during an infinite
random walk with teleportation since pi(z)v exactly equals to the frequency of visits to v.
Variations and special cases of this problem have been previously studied [2, 11, 12, 15, 18, 25, 32].
Notably, Fercoq et al. [18] cast the problem as an average cost infinite horizon Markov decision
process (MDP), also called ergodic control problem, where each node corresponds to a state and the
actions correspond to choosing a subset of included fragile edges, i.e. we have 2|F
v| actions at each
state v (see also Fig. 2a). They show that despite the exponential number of actions, the problem can
be efficiently solved in polynomial time, and they derive a value iteration algorithm with different
local constraints. They enforce that the final perturbed graph has at most bv total number of edges per
node, while we enforce that at most bv edges per node are perturbed (see Sec. 4.1).
Our approach for local budget only. Inspired by the MDP idea we derive a policy iteration (PI)
algorithm which also runs in polynomial time [25]. Intuitively, every policy corresponds to a perturbed
graph in QF , and each iteration improves the policy. The PI algorithm allows us to: incorporate our
local constraints easily, take advantage of efficient solvers for sparse systems of linear equations (line
3 in Alg. 1), and implement the policy improvement step in parallel (lines 4-6 in Alg. 1). It can easily
handle very large sets of fragile edges and it scales to large graphs.
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 which greedily selects the fragile edges finds an optimal solution for
Problem 2 with only local constraints in a number of steps independent of the size of the graph.
Algorithm 1 POLICY ITERATION WITH LOCAL BUDGET
Require: Graph G = (V, E), reward r, set of fixed Ef and fragile F edges, local budgets bv
1: Initialization: W0 ⊆ F as any arbitrary subset,AG corresponding to G
2: whileWk 6=Wk−1 do
3: Solve (IN − αD−1A)x = r for x, whereAij = 1−AGij if (i, j) ∈ Wk # flip the edges
4: Let lij ← (1− 2AGij)(xj − xi−riα ) for all (i, j) ∈ F # calculate the improvement
5: Let Lv ← {(v, j) ∈ F | lvj > 0 ∧ lvj ≥ top bv largest lvj}, ∀v ∈ V
6: Wk ←
⋃
v Lv, k ← k + 1
7: end while
8: return Wk # optimal graph G˜ ∈ QF obtained by flipping all (i, j) ∈ Wk of G
We provide the proof in Sec. 8.3 in the appendix. The main idea for Alg. 1 is starting from a random
policy, in each iteration we first compute the mean reward before teleportation x for the current policy
(line 3), and then greedily select the top bv edges that improve the policy (lines 4-6). This algorithm
is guaranteed to converge to the optimal policy, and thus to the optimal configuration of fragile edges.
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Figure 1: The upper part outlines our approach for local budget only: the exact certificate is efficiently
computed with policy iteration. The lower part outlines our 3 step approach for local and global
budget: (a) forumlate an MDP on an auxiliary graph, (b) augment the corresponding LP with quadratic
constraints to enforce the global budget, and (c) apply the RLT relaxation to the resulting QCLP.
Certificate for local budget only. Proposition 1 implies that for local constraints only, the optimal
solution does not depend on the teleport vector z. Regardless of the node t (i.e. which z = et in
Eq. 3), the optimal edges to perturb are the same if the admissible set QF and the reward r are the
same. This means that for a fixed QF we only need to run the algorithm K ×K times to obtain
the certificates for all N nodes: For each pair of classes c1, c2 we have a different reward vector
r = −(H:,c1 −H:,c2), and we can recover the exact worst-case margins m∗yt,∗(·) for all N nodes
by just computingΠ on the resulting K ×K many perturbed graphs G˜. Now, m∗yt,∗(·) > 0 implies
certifiable robustness, while m∗yt,∗(·) < 0 implies certifiable non-robustness due to the exactness of
our certificate, i.e. we have found an adversarial example for node t.
Our approach for both local and global budget. Algorithm 1 cannot handle a global budget
constraint, and in general solving Problem 2 with global budget is NP-hard. More specifically, it
generalizes the Link Building problem [32] – find the set of k optimal edges that point to a given
node such that its PageRank score is maximized – which is W[1]-hard and for which there exists no
fully-polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS). It follows that Problem 2 is also W[1]-hard
and allows no FPTAS. We provide the proof and more detials in Sec. 8.5 in the appendix. Therefore,
we develop an alternative approach that consists of three steps and is outlined in the lower part of
Fig. 1: (a) We propose an alternative unconstrained MDP based on an auxiliary graph which reduces
the action set from exponential to binary by adding only |F| auxiliary nodes; (b) We reformulate the
problem as a non-convex Quadratically Constrained Linear Program (QCLP) to be able to handle the
global budget; (c) We utilize the Reformulation Linearization Technique (RLT) to construct a convex
relaxation of the QCLP, enabling us to efficiently compute a lower bound on the worst-case margin.
(a) Auxiliary graph. Given an input graph we add one auxiliary node vij for each fragile edge
(i, j) ∈ F . We define a total cost infinite horizon MDP on this auxiliary graph (Fig. 2b) that
solves Problem 2 without constraints. The MDP is defined by the 4-tuple (S, (Ai)i∈S , p, r), where
S is the state space (preexisting and auxiliary nodes), and Ai is the set of admissible actions
in state i. Given action a ∈ Ai, p(j|i, a) is the probability to go to state j from state i and
r(i, a) the instantaneous reward. Each preexisting node i has a single action Ai = {a}, reward
r(i, a) = ri, and uniform transitions p(vij |i, a) = d−1i ,∀vij ∈ F i, discounted by α for the fixed
edges p(j|i, a) = α · d−1i ,∀(i, j) ∈ Ef , where di = |E if ∪ F i| is the degree. For each auxiliary
node we allow two actions Avij = {on, off}. For action "off" node vij goes back to node i
with probability 1 and obtains reward −ri: p(i|vij , off) = 1, r(vij , off) = −ri. For action "on"
node vij goes only to node j with probability α (the model is substochastic) and obtains 0 reward:
p(j|vij , on) = α, r(vij , on) = 0. We introduce fewer aux. nodes compared to previous work [11, 17].
(b) Global and local budgets QCLP. Based on this unconstrained MDP, we can derive a correspond-
ing linear program (LP) solving the same problem [34]. Since the MDP on the auxiliary graph has
(at most) binary action sets, the LP has only 2|V|+ 3|F| constraints and variables. This is in strong
contrast to the LP corresponding to the previous average cost MPD [18] operating directly on the
original graph that has an exponential number of constraints and variables. Lastly, we enrich the
LP for the aux. graph MDP with additional constraints enforcing the local and global budgets. The
constraints for the local budget are linear, however, the global budget requires quadratic constraints
resulting in a quadratically constrained linear program (QCLP) that exactly solves Problem 2.
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(a) Ai = {∅, {j}, {k}, {j, k}} (b) Ai = {a} and Avij = Avik = {off, on}
Figure 2: Construction of the auxiliary graph. For each fragile edge (i, j) marked with a red dashed
line, we add one node vij and two actions: {on, off} to the auxiliary graph. If the edge is configured
as "on" vij goes back to node i with prob. 1. If configured as "off" it goes only to node j with prob. α.
Proposition 2. Solving the following QCLP (with decision variables xv, x0ij , x1ij , β0ij , β1ij) is equiva-
lent to solving Problem 2 with local and global constraints, i.e. the value of the objective function is
the same in the optimal solution. We can recover pi(z)v from xv via pi(z)v = (1− kvd−1v )xv . Here
kv is the number of "off" fragile edges (the ones where x0ij > 0) in the optimal solution.
max
∑
v∈V xvrv −
∑
(i,j)∈F x
0
ijri (4a)
xv − α
∑
(i,v)∈Ef
xi
di︸ ︷︷ ︸
incoming fixed edges
−α
∑
(j,v)∈F x
1
jv︸ ︷︷ ︸
incoming "on" edges
−
∑
(v,k)∈F x
0
vk︸ ︷︷ ︸
returning "off" edges
= (1− α)zv ∀v ∈ V (4b)
x0ij + x
1
ij =
xi
di
, x0ij ≥ 0, x1ij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ F (4c)∑
(v,i)∈F [(v, i) ∈ E ]x
0
ij︸ ︷︷ ︸
removed existing edges
+ [(v, i) /∈ E ]x1ij︸ ︷︷ ︸
newly added edges
≤ xv
dv
bv, xv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V (4d)
x0ijβ
1
ij = 0, x
1
ijβ
0
ij = 0, β
1
ij = 1− β0ij , 0 ≤ β0ij ≤ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ F (4e)∑
(i,j)∈F [(i, j) ∈ E ]β
0
ij + [(i, j) /∈ E ]β1ij ≤ B (4f)
Key idea and insights. Eqs. 4b and 4c correspond to the LP of the unconstrained MDP. Intuitively,
the variable xv maps to the PageRank score of node v, and from the variables x0ij/x
1
ij we can recover
the optimal policy: if the variable x0ij (respectively x
1
ij) is non-zero then in the optimal policy the
fragile edge (i, j) is turned off (respectively on). Since there exists a deterministic optimal policy,
only one of them is non-zero but never both. Eq. 4d corresponds to the local budget. Remarkably,
despite the variables x0ij/x
1
ij not being integral, since they share the factor xid
−1
i from Eq. 4c we
can exactly count the number of edges that are turned off or on using only linear constraints. Eqs. 4e
and 4f enforce the global budget. From Eq. 4e we have that whenever x0ij is nonzero it follows that
β1ij = 0 and β
0
ij = 1 since that is the only configuration that satisfies the constraints (similarly for
x1ij). Intuitively, this effectively makes the β
0
ij/β
1
ij variables "counters" and we can utilize them in
Eq. 4f to enforce the total number of perturbed edges to not exceed B. See detailed proof in Sec. 8.3.
(c) Efficient Reformulation Linearization Technique (RLT). The quadratic constraints in our
QCLP make the problem non-convex and difficult to solve. We relax the problem using the Refor-
mulation Linearization Technique (RLT) [38] which gives us an upper bound on the objective. The
alternative SDP-relaxation [43] based on semidefinite programming is not suitable for our problem
since the constraints are trivially satisfied (see Appendix 8.4 for details). While in general, the RLT
introduces many new variables (replacing each product term mimj with a variable Mij) along with
multiple new linear inequality constraints, it turns out that in our case the solution is highly compact:
Proposition 3. Given a fixed upper bound xv for xv and using the RLT relaxation, the quadratic
constraints in Eqs. 4e and 4f transform into the following single linear constraint.∑
(i,j)∈F [(i, j) ∈ E ]x
0
ijdi(xi)
−1 + [(i, j) /∈ E ]x1ijdi(xi)−1 ≤ B (5)
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Proof provided in Sec. 8.3 in the appendix. By replacing Eqs. 4e and 4f with Eq. 5 in Proposition 2,
we obtain a linear program which can be efficiently solved. Remarkably, we only have xv, x0ij , x
1
ij as
decision variables since we were able to eliminate all other variables. The solution is an upper bound
on the solution for Problem 2 and a lower bound on the solution for Problem 1. The final relaxed
QCLP can also be interpreted as a constrained MPD with a single additional constraint (Eq. 5) which
admits a possibly randomized optimal policy with at most one randomized state [1].
Certificate for local and global budget. To solve the relaxed QCLP and compute the final certificate
we need to provide the upper bounds xv for the constraint in Eq. 5. Since the quality of the RLT
relaxation depends on the tightness of these upper bounds, we have to carefully select them. We
provide here one solution (see Sec. 8.6 in the appendix for a faster to compute, but less tight,
alternative): Given an instance of Problem 2, we can set the reward to r = ev and invoke Algorithm
1, which is highly efficient, using the same fragile set and the same local budget. Since this explicitly
maximizes xv, the objective value of the problem is guaranteed to give a valid upper bound xv.
Invoking this procedure for every node, leads to the required upper bounds.
Now, to compute the certificate with local and global budget for a target node t, we solve the relaxed
problem for all c 6= yt, leading to objective function values Lct ≥ −m∗yt,c(t) (minus due to the
change from min to max). Thus, L∗,t = minc6=yt −Lct is a lower bound on the worst-case margin
m∗yt,∗(t). If the lower bound is positive then node t is guaranteed to be certifiably robust – there
exists no adversarial attack (among all graphs in QF ) that can change the prediction for node t.
For our policy iteration approach if m∗yt,∗(t) < 0 we are guaranteed to have found an adversarial
example since the certificate is exact, i.e. we also have a non-robustness certificate. However in this
case, if the lower bound L∗,t is negative we do not necessarily have an adversarial example. Instead,
we can perturb the graph with the optimal configuration of fragile edges for the relaxed problem, and
inspect whether the predictions change. See Fig.1 for an overview of both approaches.
5 Robust training for graph neural networks
In Sec. 4 we introduced two methods to efficiently compute certificates given a trained pi-PPNP model.
We now show that these can naturally be used to go one step further – to improve the robustness
of the model. The main idea is to utilize the worst-case margin during training to encourage the
model to learn more robust weights. Optimizing some robust loss Lθ with respect to the model
parameters θ (e.g. for pi-PNPP θ are the neural network parameters) that depends on the worst-case
margin m∗yv,∗(v) is generally hard since it involves an inner optimization problem, namely finding
the worst-case margin. This prevents us to easily take the gradient of m∗yv,c(v) (and, thus, Lθ) w.r.t.
the parameters θ. Previous approaches tackle this challenge by using the dual [46].
Inspecting our problem, however, we see that we can directly compute the gradient. Since m∗yv,c(v)
(respectively the corresponding lower bound) is a linear function of H = fθ(X) and piG, and
furthermore the admissible set QF over which we are optimizing is compact, it follows from
Danskin’s theorem [14] that we can simply compute the gradient of the loss at the optimal point. We
have
∂m∗yv,c(v)
∂Hi,yv
= pi∗(ev)i and
∂m∗yv,c(v)
∂Hi,c
= −pi∗(ev)i, i.e. the gradient equals to the optimal (±)
PageRank scores computed in our certification approaches.
Robust training. To improve robustness Wong & Kolter [46] proposed to optimize the robust
cross-entropy loss: LRCE = LCE(y∗v ,−m∗yv (v)), where LCE is the standard cross-entropy loss
operating on the logits, and m∗yv (v) is a vector such that at index c we have m
∗
yv,c(v). Previous
work has shown that if the model is overconfident there is a potential issue when using LRCE
since it encourages high certainty under the worst-case perturbations [58]. Therefore, we also
study the alternative robust hinge loss. Since the attacker wants to minimize the worst-case margin
m∗yt,∗(t) (or its lower bound), a straightforward idea is to try to maximize it during training. To
achieve this we add a hinge loss penalty term to the standard cross-entropy loss. Specifically:
LCEM =
∑
v∈VL
[LCE(y∗v ,Hdiffv,: ) +∑c∈C,c6=y∗v max(0,M −m∗yv,c(v))]. The second term for a
single node v is positive if m∗yv,c(v) < M and zero otherwise – the node v is certifiably robust with a
margin of at least M . Effectively, if all training nodes are robust, the second term becomes zero, thus,
reducing LCEM to the standard cross-entropy loss with robustness guarantees. Note again that we
can easily compute the gradient of these losses w.r.t. the (neural network) parameters θ.
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Figure 3: Increasing local attack strength s (local budget bv = max(dv − 11 + s, 0)) decreases ratio
of certified nodes. (a) The graph is more robust to removing edges, pi-PPNP is most robust overall.
(b) Lowering α improves the robustness. (c) Nodes with higher neighborhood purity are more robust.
6 Experimental results
Setup. We focus on evaluating the robustness of pi-PPNP without robust training and label/feature
propagation using our two certification methods. We also verify that robust training improves the
robustness of pi-PPNP while maintaining high predictive accuracy. We demonstrate our claims on two
publicly available datasets: Cora-ML (N = 2, 995, |E| = 8, 416, D = 2, 879,K = 7) [4, 30] and
Citeseer (N = 3, 312, |E| = 4, 715, D = 3, 703,K = 6) [37] with further experiments on Pubmed
(N = 19, 717, |E| = 44, 324, D = 500,K = 3) [37] in the appendix. We configure pi-PPNP with
one hidden layer of size 64 and set α = 0.85. We select 20 nodes per class for the train/validation
set and use the rest for the test set. We compute the certificates w.r.t. the predictions, i.e. we set yt
in m∗yt,∗(t) to the predicted class for node t on the clean graph. See Sec. 8.2 in the appendix for
further experiments and Sec. 8.7 for more details. Note, we do not need to compare to any previously
introduced adversarial attacks on graphs [13, 58, 60], since by the definition of a certificate for a
certifiably robust node w.r.t. a given admissible setQF there exist no successful attack within that set.
We construct several different configurations of fixed and fragile edges to gain a better understanding
of the robustness of the methods to different kind of adversarial perturbations. Namely, "both" refers
to the scenario where F = V × V , i.e. the attacker is allowed to add or remove any edge in the graph,
while "rem." refers to the scenario where F = E for a given graph G = (V, E), i.e. the attacker can
only remove existing edges. In addition, for all scenarios we specify the fixed set as Ef = Emst,
where (i, j) ∈ Emst if (i, j) belongs to the minimum spanning tree (MST) on the graph G.3
Robustness certificates: Local budget only. We investigate the robustness of different graphs and
semi-supervised node classification methods when the attacker has only local budget constraints.
We set the local budget bv = max(dv − 11 + s, 0) relative to the degree dv of node v in the clean
graph, and we vary the local attack strength s with lower s leading to a more restrictive budget. Such
relative budget is justified since higher degree nodes tend to be more robust in general [59, 60]. We
then apply our policy iteration algorithm to compute the (exact) worst-case margin for each node.
In Fig. 3a we see that the number of certifiably robust nodes when the attacker can only remove edges
is significantly higher compared to when they can also add edges which is consistent with previous
work on adversarial attacks [60]. As expected, the share of robust nodes decreases with higher budget,
and pi-PPNP is significantly more robust than label propagation since besides the graph it also takes
advantage of the node attributes. Feature propagation has similar performance (F1 score) but it is
less robust. Note that since our certificate is exact, the remaining nodes are certifiably non-robust! In
Sec. 8.2 in the appendix we also investigate certifiable accuracy – the ratio of nodes that are both
certifiably robust and at the same time have a correct prediction. We find that the certifiable accuracy
is relatively close to the clean accuracy, and it decreases gracefully as we in increase the budget.
Analyzing influence on robustness. In Fig. 3b we see that decreasing the damping factor α is an
effective strategy to significantly increase the robustness with no noticeable loss in accuracy (at most
0.5% for any α, not shown). Thus, α provides a useful trade-off between robustness and the size of
the effective neighborhood: higher α implies higher PageRank scores (i.e. higher influence) for the
3 Fixing the MST edges ensures that every node is reachable by every other node for any policy. This is only
to simplify our earlier exposition regarding the MDPs and can be relaxed to e.g. reachable at the optimal policy.
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Figure 4: (a) The global budget can significantly restrict the attacker compared to having only local
constraints. (b) Even for large fragile sets Algorithm 1 only needs few iterations to find the optimal
PageRank. (c) Our robust training successfully increases the percentage of certifiably robust nodes.
The increase is largest for the local attack strength that we used during training (s = 10, dashed line).
neighbors. In general we recommend to set the value as low as the accuracy allows. In Fig. 3c we
investigate what contributes to certain nodes being more robust than others. We see that neighborhood
purity – the share of nodes with the same class in a respective node’s two-hop neighborhood – plays an
important role. High purity leads to high worst-case margin, which translates to certifiable robustness.
Robustness certificates: Local and global budget. We demonstrate our second approach based on
the relaxed QCLP problem by analyzing the robustness as we increase the global budget. We set
F = E , i.e. the attacker can only remove edges, and vary the local attack strength s corresponding
to local budget bv = max(dv − 11 + s, 0). We see in Fig.4a that by additionally enforcing a global
budget we can significantly restrict the success of the attacker compared to having only a local budget
(dashed lines). The global constraint increases the number of robust nodes, validating our approach.
Efficiency. Fig. 4b demonstrates the efficiency of our approach: even for fragile sets as large as 104,
Algorithm 1 finds the optimal solution in just a few iterations. Since each iteration is itself efficient
by utilizing sparse matrix operations, the overall wall clock runtime (shown as text annotation) is
on the order of few seconds. In Sec. 8.2 in the appendix, we further investigate the runtime as we
increase the number of nodes in the graph, as well as the runtime of our relaxed QCLP.
Robust training. While not being our core focus, we investigate whether robust training improves
the certifiable robustness of GNNs. We set the fragile set F = E and vary the local budget. The
vertical line on Fig. 4c indicates the local budget used to train the robust models with losses LRCE
and LCEM . We see that both of our approaches are able to improve the percent of certifiably robust
nodes, with the largest improvement (around 13% increase) for the local attack strength we trained
on (s = 10). Furthermore, the F1 scores on the test split for Citeseer are as follows: 0.70 for LCE ,
0.72 for LRCE , and 0.73 for LCEM , i.e. the robust training besides improving the ratio of certified
nodes, it also improves the clean predictive accuracy of the model. LRCE has a higher certifiable
robustness, but LCEM has a higher F1 score. There is room for improvement in how we approach
the robust training: e.g. similar to Zügner & Günnemann [59] we can optimize over the worst-case
margin for the unlabeled in addition to the labeled nodes. We leave this as a future research direction.
7 Conclusion
We derive the first (non-)robustness certificate for graph neural networks regarding perturbations
of the graph structure, and the first certificate overall for label/feature propagation. Our certificates
are flexible w.r.t. the threat model, can handle both local (per node) and global budgets, and can
be efficiently computed. We also propose a robust training procedure that increases the number of
certifiably robust nodes while improving the predictive accuracy. As future work, we aim to consider
perturbations and robustification of the node features and the graph structure jointly.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Certificates for Label Propagation and Feature Propagation
Label propagation is a classic method for semi-supervised node classification, and there have been
many variants proposed over the year [54, 55, 53]. The general idea is to find a classification function
F such that the training nodes are predicted correctly and the predicted labels change smoothly over
the graph. We can express this formally via the following optimization problem [39]:
min
F
{ N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Aij
∥∥dσ−1i Fi∗ − dσ−1j Fj∗∥∥2 + µ N∑
i=1
d2σ−1i ‖Fi∗ −Hi∗‖2
}
(6)
where, di is the node degree, µ is a regularization parameter trading off smoothness and predicting
the labeled nodes correctly, σ is a hyper-parameter, andH is a matrix where the rows are one-hot
vectors for the training nodes and zero vectors otherwise (i.e.Hvc = 1 if {v ∈ VL ∧ yv = c} and
Hvc = 0 otherwise). The resulting matrix F ∈ RN×K is the learned classification function, i.e. the
value Fvc gives us the (unnormalized) probability that node v belongs to a class c, and we can make
predictions by taking the argmax. The problem can be solved in closed form (even though in practice
one would use power iteration) and the solution is: F = (1− α) (IN − αD−σADσ−1)−1H for
α = 2/(2 + µ). We can see that setting σ = 1, i.e. the standard Laplacian variant [53] we obtain:
F = (1− α) (IN − αD−1A)−1H = ΠH (7)
From Eq. 7 we have that Label Propagation is very similar to our pi-PPNP: instead of diffusing logits
which come from a neural network it propagates the one-hot vectors of the labeled nodes instead.
From here onwards we apply our proposed method without any modifications by simply providing a
differentH matrix in Problem 1.
We can also certify the feature propagation (FP) approach of which there are several variants: e.g.
the normalized Laplacian FP [7], or a recently proposed equivalent model termed simple graph
convolution (SGC) [47]. Feature propagation is carried out in two steps: (i) the node features are
diffused to incorporate the graph structureXdiff = ΠX , and (ii) a simple logistic regression model
is trained using the diffused featuresXdiff and subset of labelled nodes. Now, let theW ∈ RD×K be
the weights corresponding to a trained logistic regression model. The predictions for all nodes are
calculated as Y = softmax = (XdiffW ) = softmax(ΠXW ) = softmax(ΠH) with H = XW .
Thus, again by simply providing a different matrixH in Problem 1 we can certify feature propagation.
8.2 Further experiments
In Fig. 5a we show the percent of certifiable robust nodes for different local budgets on the Pubmed
graph (N = 19, 717, |E| = 44, 324, D = 500,K = 3) [37] demonstrating that our method scales
to large graphs. Similar to before (Fig. 3a), the models are more robust to attackers that can only
remove edges. In Fig. 5b we analyze the robustness of Citeseer w.r.t. increasing global budget. The
global budget constraints are again able to successfully restrict the attacker. The global budget makes
a larger difference when the attacker has a larger local attack strength (s = 10). In Fig. 5c we show
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Figure 5: (a,b) The local and global budget successfully restrict the attacker. Models are more
robust to removing edges than both removing and adding edges. (c) Our robust training successfully
increases the percentage of certifiably robust nodes.
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Figure 6: Further experiments on certifiable accuracy (a) and runtime (b-c).
that the robust training increases the percent of certifiably robust nodes. Comparing to Fig. 4c we
conclude that training with a larger local attack strength (s = 10 as opposed to s = 6) makes the
model more robust overall while the predictive performance (F1 score) is the same in both cases.
We also investigate certifiable accuracy. The ratio of nodes that are both certifiably robust and at the
same time have a correct prediction is a lower bound on the overall worst-case classification accuracy
since the worst-case perturbation can be different for each node. We plot this ratio in Fig. 6a for
Citeseer and see that the certifiable accuracy is relatively close to the clean accuracy when the budget
is restrictive, and it decreases gracefully as we in increase the budget.
To show how the runtime scales with number of nodes and number of edges we randomly generate
SBM graphs of increasing size, and we set all edges in the generated graphs as fragile (F = E). In
Fig. 6b we see the mean runtime across five runs for local budget (VI algorithm). Even for graphs
with more than 10K nodes the certificate runs in a few seconds. Similarly, Fig. 6c shows the runtime
for global budget (RLT relaxation). We see that the runtime scales linearly with the number of edges.
Furthermore, the overall runtime can be easily reduced by: (i) stopping early whenever the worst-case
margin becomes negative, (ii) using Gurobi’s distributed optimization capabilities to reduce solve
times, and (iii) having a single shared preprocessing step for all nodes.
8.3 Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1. Problem 2 can be formulated as an average cost infinite horizon Markov
decision problem, where at each node v we decide which subset of Fv edges are active, i.e. Av =
P(Fv) where P(Fv) is the power set of Fv and the reward depends only on the starting state but
not on the action and the ending state r(v, a) = rv,∀a ∈ Av . From the average cost infinite horizon
optimality criterion as shown by Fercoq et al. [18] we have:
lim
T→∞
1
T
E
( T−1∑
t=0
r
(
Xt, νt
))
= lim
T→∞
1
T
E
( T−1∑
t=0
rXt,jνj
(
Xt
))
=
∑
i,j∈[n]
piiPi,jri,j (8)
where Xt ∈ S is a random variable denoting the state of the system at the discrete time t ≥ 0, and
ν(ht) is deterministic control strategy determining a sequence of actions and is a function of the
history ht = (X0, ν0, . . . , Xt−1, νt−1, Xt). For this problem there exists a stationary (feedback)
strategy ν(Xt) that does not depend on the history such that for all t ≥ 0, νt(ht) = ν(Xt). Eq. 8
follows from the ergodic theorem for Markov chains. Here the reward is more general and can
be set depending on the edge (i, j). Letting rij = ri,∀j and plugging it in Eq. 8 we get that the
optimality criterion equals rTpi since the transion matrix P =D−1A is row-stochastic. As shown
by Hollanders et al. [25] policy iteration is well suited to optimize PageRank and our Algorithm 1
corresponds to policy iteration with local budget for the above MDP. For a fixed damping factor α
(which is our case) policy iteration always converges in less iterations than value iteration [34] and
does so in weakly polynomial time that depends on the number of fragile edges [25].
Proof. Proposition 2. Eqs. 4b and 4c correspond to the LP of the unconstrained MDP on the auxiliary
graph. Intuitively, the variable xv maps to the PageRank score of node v, and from the variables
x0ij/x
1
ij we can recover the optimal policy: if the variable x
0
ij (respectively x
1
ij) is non-zero then in the
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optimal policy the fragile edge (i, j) is turned off (respectively on). Since there exists a deterministic
optimal policy, only one of them is non-zero but never both. Eq. 4d corresponds to the local budget.
Remarkably, despite the variables x0ij/x
1
ij not being integral, since they share the factor
xi
di
from
Eq. 4c we can exactly count the number of edges that are turned off or on using only linear constraints.
Eqs. 4e and 4f enforce the global budget. From Eq. 4e we have that whenever x0ij is nonzero it
follows that β1ij = 0 and β
0
ij = 1 since that is the only configuration that satisfies the constraints
(similarly for x1ij). Intuitively, this effectively makes the β
0
ij/β
1
ij variables "counters" and thus, we
can utilize them in Eq. 4f to enforce the total number of perturbed edges to not exceed B.
We also have to show that solving the MDP on the auxiliary graph solves the same problem as the
MDP on the original graph. Recall that whenever we traverse any edge from node i we obtain reward
ri. On the other hand, whenever we traverse an edge from the auxiliary node vij corresponding
to a fragile edge (i, j) to the node i (action "off") we get negative reward −ri, and the transition
probability is 1. Intuitively, traversing back and forth between node i and node vij does not change
the overall reward obtained (since ri and −ri cancel out). That is, we have the same reward as in
the original graph with the edge (i, j) excluded. Similarly, when we traverse the edge from auxiliary
node vij to the node j (action "on") we obtain 0 reward, i.e. no additional reward is gained and the
transition happens with probability α. Therefore, the overall reward is the same as if the fragile edge
(i, j) would be present in the original graph.
More formally, for any given arbitrary policy for the unconstrained MDP on the auxiliary graph, let
kv be the current number of "off" fragile edges for node v and let Fv+ be the current set of "on" fragile
edges. From Eqs.4b and Eqs.4c we have:
xv − α
∑
(i,v)∈Ef∪Fv+
xid
−1
i − kvd−1v = (1− α)zv (9a)
xv = α
∑
(i,v)∈Ef∪Fv+
xid
−1
i + (1− α)zv − kvd−1v =⇒ xv = pi(zv)v − kvd−1v (9b)
where we can see that pi(zv)v is the personalized PageRank for node v for a perturbed original graph
corresponding to the current policy, i.e. the graph where all (v, j) ∈ Fv+ for all v ∈ V are turned "on".
Plugging in Eq. 9b into the objective from Eq. 4a we have
max
∑
v∈V xvrv −
∑
(i,j)∈F x
0
ijri = max
∑
v∈V pi(zv)rv
which exactly corresponds to the objective of Problem 2. Since the above analysis holds for any
policy it also holds for the optimal policy, and therefore solving the unconstrained MDP on the
auxiliary graph is equivalent to solving the unconstrained MDP on the original graph.
Combining everything together we have that solving the QCLP is equivalent to solving Problem 2.
Proof. Proposition 3. Using the reformulation-linearization technique (RLT) we relax the quadratic
constraints in Eq. 4e. In general, from RLT it follows that we add the following four linear constraints
for each pairwise quadratic constraint mimj =Mij
Mij −mimj −mjmi ≥ −mimj (10a)
Mij −mjmi −mimj ≤ −mjmi (10b)
Mij −mimj −mjmi ≤ −mimj (10c)
Mij −mimj −mjmi ≥ −mimj (10d)
where mi ≤ mi ≤ mi are lower and upper bounds for mi.
From Eq. 4e we see that our quadratic terms always equal to 0 (Mij = 0), and we have the following
upper β0ij = β
1
ij = 1, and x
1
ij = x
0
ij =
xi
di
> 0, and lower bounds β0ij = β
1
ij = x
1
ij = x
0
ij = 0.
Plugging these upper/lower bounds into Eq. 10 for our quadratic terms x0ijβ
1
ij = 0 and x
1
ijβ
0
ij = 0
we see that the constraints arising from Eqs. 10a, 10b and 10c are always trivially fulfilled. Thus we
are left with the constraints arising from Eq. 10d which for our problem are:
x0ij + x
0
ijβ
1
ij ≤ x0ij and x1ij + x1ijβ0ij ≤ x1ij (11)
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There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: The edge is turned "off". We have x0ij = xid
−1
i and x
1
ij = 0.
x0ij + x
0
ijβ
1
ij ≤ x0ij =⇒ x0ij(x0ij)−1 + β1ij ≤ 1 =⇒
=⇒ x0ij(x0ij)−1 ≤ β0ij =⇒ x0ij(xidappproofs−1i )−1 ≤ β0ij
And trivially: x1ij + x
1
ijβ
0
ij ≤ x1ij =⇒ x1ijβ0ij ≤ x1ij =⇒ β0ij ≤ 1.
Case 2: The edge is turned "on". We have x1ij = xid
−1
i and x
0
ij = 0.
x1ij + x
1
ijβ
0
ij ≤ x1ij =⇒ x1ij(x1ij)−1 + β0ij ≤ 1 =⇒ x1ij(xid−1i )−1 ≤ β1ij
And trivially: x0ij + x
0
ijβ
1
ij ≤ x0ij =⇒ x0ijβ1ij ≤ x0ij =⇒ β1ij ≤ 1
The above two cases are disjoint and we can plug β0ij and β
1
ij into Eq. 4f to obtain Eq.5.
8.4 SDP relaxation
In this section we show that the SDP-relaxation [43] based on semidefinite programming is not
suitable for our problem since the constraints are trivially fulfilled. For convinience, we rename
the variables that participate in the quadratic constraints (β0ij , x
0
ij , . . . ) to (y1, y2, . . . ). The SDP
relaxation replaces the product terms yiyj (e.g. x0ijβ
1
ij) by an element Yij of an n× n matrix Y and
adds the constraint Y − yyT  0, where y is the vector of variables. Since in the original QCLP
there are no terms of the form yiyi corresponding to the elements on the diagonal, we can make the
diagonal elements Yii arbitrarily high to make the matrix Y −yyT positive semidefinite and trivially
satisfy the constraint.
8.5 Hardness of PageRank optimization with global budget
The Link Building problem [32, 33] aims at maximizing the PageRank of a single given node v by
selecting a set of k optimal edges that point to node v. We will use the fact that the Link Building
problem is a special case of Problem 2 to derive our hardness result.
Problem 3 (Link Building [32]). Given a graph G = (V, E), node v ∈ V , budget k ∈ Z, and any
fixed α ∈ (0, 1). Find a set S ⊆ V \ {v} with |S| = k maximizing piG˜,α(e/n)v in the perturbed
graph G˜ = (V, E˜ := Ef ∪ (S × {v})), where e/n is the teleport vector for the uniform distribution.
Proposition 4. Problem 2 with global budget is W[1]-hard and allows no FPTAS.
Proof. Setting the teleport vector to the uniform distribution z = e/n, the reward vector to r = ev ,
the set of fragile edges to F = (V \ {v})× {v}, the set of fixed edges to Ef = E , and configuring
the budgets as bv = 1,∀v and B = k we see that the Problem 3 is a special case of Problem 2. Note
that, since we can always increase piv by adding edges pointing to v, the x ≤ B global constraint is
equivalent to the x = B constraint where x is the expression on the left-hand side in Eq. 4f.
Olsen [32] shows that the Link Building problem is W[1]-hard and admits no FPTAS by reducing
it to the Regular Independent Set problem which is W[1]-complete [8]. Therefore, Problem 2 with
global budget is also W[1]-hard and allows no FPTAS since k is preserved in the reduction.
8.6 Alternative upper bound
As an alternative upper bound for xv we can use the following approach: Assume we have given
a fixed set of edges Ef where every node has at least one fixed edge. From Proposition 2 we have
xv = (1 − kvd−1v )−1piv. To maximize this value, we can simply set pi(z)v = 1 (since this is the
maximal PageRank score achievable) and kv = |Fv|. Since every node has at least one fixed edge,
we have dv > kv , i.e. the inverse is always defined.
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8.7 Further experimental details
We preprocess each graph and keep only the nodes that belong to largest connected component. The
resulting graph for Cora-ML has N = 2, 810, |E| = 10, 138, for Citeseer N = 2, 110, |E| = 7, 336
and for Pubmed N = 19, 717, |E| = 88, 648. Unless otherwise specified we set α = 0.85. We
compute the certificates with respect to the predicted class label, i.e. we set yt in m∗yt,∗(t) to the
predicted class for node t using the clean graph. Experiments are run on Nvidia 1080Ti GPUs using
CUDA and TensorFlow and on Intel CPUs. We use the GUROBI solver to solve the linear programs.
We configure our pi-PPNP model with one hidden layer and choose a latent dimensionality of 64.
We randomly select 20 nodes per class for the training/validation set, and use the rest for the testing.
The weights θ are regularized with the L2 norm with strength of 5e− 2. We train for a maximum of
10, 000 epoch with a fixed learning rate of 1e− 2 and patience of 100 epochs for early stopping. We
train the model for five different random splits and report the averaged results.
When reporting results for local budget (e.g. Figs. 3, 4c, 5a, 5c) we evaluate the certifiable robustness
for all test nodes, since as we discussed in Sec. 4.3 we only need to run Algorithm 1 K ×K times to
obtain certificates for all nodes. When reporting results for global budget (e.g. Figs. 4a and 5b) we
randomly select 150 test nodes for which we compute the certificate. For all results regarding runtime
(e.g. Figs. 4b, 6b, 6c) we report average time across five runs on a machine with 20 CPU cores.
17
